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July 6, 1962

TO: M - George C. McGhee
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Carl Kaysen, White House

FROM: S/P - Henry Owen

SUBJECT: Planning Group Meeting, July 10, 1962

The attached paper, "The White Redoubt" of June 28, 1962 will be discussed at the Planning Group meeting on Tuesday, July 10.

Attachment:

The White Redoubt
June 28, 1962.

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Copy No. 14
of 23 copies. ASECRET/NOFORNTHE WHITE REDOUBTI. Introduction and Summary

The seeds of another Algeria have been sown in Southern Africa. Blacks face Whites across a sea of developing hate. With this confrontation and the increasing polarization of racial relations the White supremacists are seeking to strengthen their established positions.

The white peoples of these territories - the Republic of South Africa, the Portuguese African possessions of Angola and Mozambique and the Central African Federation (the Rhodesias and Nyasaland) - are taking up a defensive position along a rampart from which they feel there is no retreat. They appear to be developing bonds of mutual fear in the face of advancing Black African nationalism and their governments are contemplating a mutual defense strategy, if not economic and political union as well. Theirs is, in effect, a last white stronghold against black invasion from the north and racist-inspired upheavals from within.

From the north pressing against these white communities comes the tide of nationalism. In this area, 26 newly independent states, mainly black, have found their freedom since the end of World War II. More new black nations will add to these pressures this year and next.

The possible collision of these rival forces in a world already full of racial hatreds is highly dangerous. A Black-White confrontation on the southern tip of Africa, particularly in an area where U.S.

investments

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investments are extensive, and U.S. nationals are numerous, is perilous in terms of U.S. objectives in Africa as a whole.

There are even more cogent reasons than these which must give us concern--notably the likelihood of the Cold War being introduced into Africa on the wings of racial bias; the weakening of our own relationships with Africa which would ensure; the weakening of the UN; and the domestic dilemma with which the U.S. would be confronted in event of such tragedy.

It should be the policy of the United States to mitigate the polarization of the races into two warring factions. Unfortunately, this polarization has already proceeded a long way, and our efforts must now be directed toward preventing it from developing so completely that strife cannot be averted. Unless this aim is accomplished, we may be faced with a major racial war, the consequences of which could even mean that masses of white inhabitants will be driven out of Africa. We have not yet made a full assessment of the military potential of the Redoubt group. South Africa could no doubt supply her own military needs but probably would have difficulty in meeting all the needs of her partners.

It is difficult if not impossible accurately to estimate the pace of events. The problems of Angola are upon us today. The Rhodesian problems (at least those of Southern Rhodesia) are developing so swiftly they may be with us full force within the next year. The
problem

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problems of South Africa are only slightly more long range. In all areas time is running out.

II. Statement of the Problem

A. Position of the Whites

The threat of sustained and violent conflict between white and black Africans is mounting in the southern quarter of the African continent. This confrontation, which may be expected to materialize over the next several years given present trends, could seriously undermine the position of the West in Africa, as well as weaken our moral position in the Middle East and Asia. At the heart of this confrontation, despite any political or economic overtones, are the emotion-laden problems of race. The latter contain subtle psychological ramifications involving feelings of inferiority, grievance and discrimination, which do not lend themselves to easy solution through contemporary diplomacy.

Particularly complicating the problem in the areas most vitally affected - the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Portuguese territories and the Republic of South Africa - is the presence of a large European population with strong historical roots in Africa. Numbering in excess of 3.5 million (roughly 10% of the total population), they have erected a pantheon of privilege, wealth and status which they do not intend to surrender. Nevertheless, the bulk of southern Africa's white peoples are becoming increasingly conscious of the

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of the rise of African nationalism in neighboring areas, as well as convinced that the "wind of change" has already begun to move in their direction.

B. The Rise of African Nationalism

White perturbation in southern Africa is based upon concrete reality. Indeed, political positions and economic interests, which appeared secure as recently as 1958, have become endangered. The experience of European settlers in Algeria with nationalist terrorism, the acquisition of independence by more than 20 African states since December 1959, and the political instability of the Congo, all have heightened white apprehensions in southern Africa. The outbreak of rebellion in northern Angola early in 1961 transformed official white apprehension into outright alarm.

There is developing among the whites a realization that they are very much alone in Africa - not only racially, but as a political minority as well. Consequently, many of them look northward in anticipation of mounting assaults from the more extreme African nationalists.

Tangible evidence, thus far, has been ample to substantiate and enflame white fears. During the past year, efforts on the part of various independent African states to aid nationalist movements in southern Africa have grown appreciably. These efforts have ranged from the noisy, self-proclaimed support of the Ghanaian CPP (Convention People's Party) to the quiet and probably more effective cooperation

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of the Tunisian Government. The latter, in concert with the Algerian Government, provides training in combat for Angolan nationalists led by the moderate chieftain, Holden Roberto. (The Moroccan Government, on the other hand, has provided safehaven and substantial material assistance to the rival Communist-backed MPLA organization.)

In West Africa, vigorous efforts have been initiated by the Nkrumah regime to attract nationalists from southern Africa to the Ghanaian propaganda and special training school at Winneba. Of the several hundred Africans who have passed through this school, a large number have received not only political indoctrination but financial aid and the promise of arms when their plans have matured sufficiently. In East Africa, the present moderate level of nationalist assistance to African liberation movements probably will change dramatically as more of the area's territories gain independence. This development was clearly portended at the PAFMECA (Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa) meeting held at Addis Ababa in February 1962 during which the various delegations pledged their support to nationalist colleagues in southern Africa.¹

Another shock to the already nervous white communities is the formation of a military High Command among the so-called "Casablanca powers" - Morocco, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.² Despite the Command's

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1. See RAF/RM-23, PAFMECA Conference at Addis Ababa Reflects African Urge for Regional Solidarity. February 23, 1962, CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN.
 2. See RAF/RM-35, The African High Command: Political Myths and Military Realities, April 30, 1962. SECRET/NOFORN

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Command's many military infirmities, its political impact probably will be substantial. Indeed, we anticipate that it will attempt to become the principal training organization and armorer of "liberation movements" preparing uprisings in southern Africa. In part for this purpose, its member states have accepted and stored large quantities of Communist Bloc arms and material. (see page _____).

C. The White Response to the Challenge

In the face of the African challenge in the north, the white response has been hesitant and groping. In general, there has been a withdrawal inward, a hesitant and defensive search for new guidelines for action. This reaction has been engendered in part by white awareness that their best friends and customers in the West are no longer willing to extend them unqualified diplomatic and material support. South Africa's loss of Commonwealth membership, Portugal's denunciation by the United Nations, and the formation of the UN "Committee of Seventeen" to investigate inter alia political progress in the Rhodesias, have underscored the erosion of the International position of the whites in southern Africa.

As a consequence, the concept of the "white redoubt" has gained in currency among some unofficial circles in the Republic of South Africa, the Rhodesias and the Portuguese territories.¹ While only vaguely

1. See RAF/RM, The White Redoubt: A Preliminary Assessment. April 4, 1962 SECRET/NOFORN

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vaguely defined in its present stage of evolution, the concept has as its main purposes: (a) the establishment among the states concerned of effective security and military arrangements to frustrate any attempts to subvert legally constituted white governments through violence or other extra-legal means; and (b) the blunting of black nationalism by forceful repression of "seditional" groups in each of the threatened territories.

Thus far, however, the concept has received only limited official acceptance in formal terms. Current indications are that no fixed treaty arrangements have been concluded by any of the governments most vitally concerned, but covert understandings appear to exist. A number of factors inhibit collaboration. In addition to our own concern on the subject, other Western nations have held such an approach to be philosophically indefensible. Furthermore, there is clearly no unanimity in present policies on how to meet the African challenge. The white response to the African nationalist challenge today varies from outright repression in Angola, where the threat is greatest, to modified restrictions in Southern Rhodesia, and a Bantustan-Apartheid answer in South Africa.

The steps taken to date toward coordination of defense arrangements can and probably will lead to a strong regional security pact. These trends will be strengthened by any or all of the following contingencies:

1. A Violent

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1. A Violent Upsurge of African Nationalist Attacks in Angola and/or Anti-White Violence in the Rhodesias.
2. An Outbreak of Sustained Dissidence in Mozambique.
3. Mounting Arms Supplies and Other Aid to African Nationalists by Independent African States or the Communist Bloc.

D. The Role of Third Forces

As the confrontation between blacks and whites in southern Africa crystallizes, several groups of nations outside the continent might play significant roles. The Communist Bloc, in particular, can be expected to seek to exacerbate tensions in the area, both directly and indirectly. The Bloc, for example, probably will seek to encourage greater efforts by the Casablanca states to serve as the bankers, arms supplies, and tactical guides for embryonic liberation movements in Southern Africa. The Bloc itself thus would avoid direct entanglement and the charge of foisting its own type of neo-colonialism on Africans. Finally, should racial conflict mount in the white redoubt areas of southern Africa, the West, moderate African leaders, and whites in general would all be placed in an increasingly difficult and nearly untenable position.

For these reasons, we can anticipate that the formation of an African High Command by the Casablanca group will receive strong endorsement from the Communist Bloc. The Soviet Union almost certainly will see

numerous

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numerous rather obvious advantages for itself in such a military arrangement, including the potential role of armorer and supplier. Already heavily committed to the provision of modern arms and aircraft to some of the Casablanca states, the Soviet Union probably would hope to enlarge its penetration in the very sensitive field of foreign aid.

The West, on the other hand, has few "third party" assets to counter this Soviet advantage. Britain's credit among black Africans remains relatively high, but London is trapped in a morass of maneuver and counter-maneuver in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, is experiencing severe problems in East Africa, and is without much influence within the Afrikaner administration at Pretoria. France suffers comparable difficulties. Probably the only nation capable of exercising serious influence - with the exception of the U.S. - is Brazil. Conceivably, with adequate preparation, Brazil might be persuaded to enter a loose association with Portugal and the African territories, one in which Portugal is induced to initiate liberal reforms. However, such a venture would require careful and fully coordinated planning.

III. U.S. Objectives and Possible Courses of Action

A. In the Portuguese Territories

The Problem. Among the dilemmas forced upon us by the creation of the "White Redoubt", none is more complex than our current relationship with the Portuguese. The crux of this problem is our defense
alliance

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alliance with that country which permits the use of the Azores as a military base, but overlapping this arrangement is our basic African policy. The foundation-stone of this policy, here having particular application to the Portuguese African Territories of Angola and Mozambique, is our historic recognition of the right of self-determination and our reputation as a champion of free peoples. Yet we must necessarily be concerned with maintenance of order. Portugal, a member of NATO and the oldest dictatorship in Western Europe with a colonial history extending back 500 years on the African mainland, forces us to make an embarrassing choice between security requirements and basic political principle.

The military situation is relative; the political principles are absolute. The defense which is afforded Western Europe and Portugal by our use of the Azores may be considered of greater benefit to Portugal and her NATO allies than to the U.S. This view Salazar should be made to recognize.

Salazar refuses aid from us in exchange for inaugurating more liberal policies in his African dependencies. Moreover, his regime is weak and should we exert too much pressure, it would likely topple with unknown elements coming into power in metropolitan Portugal.

The rebellion among the peoples of Angola and the stirrings of the people of Mozambique represent the natural expectations of awakening Africans. These pressures against Portugal will increase in the

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immediate future and as they multiply the pressures against us are bound to grow as well.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that among Angolan nationalists, pro-communist elements have appeared while moderate democratic elements remain weak. The Angolan question has become a cause célèbre for black African nationalists everywhere and this likewise places the U.S. in a dilemma, particularly in the U.N. The Portuguese question offers little hope in terms of immediate U.S. objectives and courses of action; yet it must be faced straight-forwardly in view of the ever greater risks envisioned by the "White Redoubt" prospect.

The Objective. Our objectives are multiple and semi-conflicting. We must seek to maintain our defense position in the Azores but this must not be allowed to undermine our entire African policy and our friendship with newly independent nations in the U.N. We cannot acquiesce totally either to the Portuguese or to the Africans. This attitude befits our standing as a world power and leader of free peoples.

Possible Courses of Action

(1) It is suggested that President Kennedy undertake a discussion of our mutual problems with Premier Salazar directly either by personal letter or by personal representation of a special emissary. These discussions should include the entire range of mutual problems from the Azores through Africa to the U.N. It is recommended that in the course of these conversations two separate dialogues be established, one

concerning

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concerning the Azores Base per se and the second concerning the African problems and our mutual relationships thereto. Such dialogues could run concurrently but insofar as possible the subject matters should be kept independent of each other.

(2) The Azores base question can perhaps best be handled by a "stretch out". Time may resolve the dilemma with developing Black nations on the continent of Africa and a change in Portugal's regime. Missile advances may also outmode the Azores. Give this time, perhaps sufficient leeway can be gained for operation of the base long enough that it can eventually be abandoned. Alternatively, should the Portuguese demand our ouster, it is recommended that we simply temporize, as the Portuguese would hardly be in a position to drive us out.

(3) We should continue to seek the good offices of other nations in our relations with Portugal, especially those of Brazil. President Goulart's forthcoming state visit to West Africa may provide an admirable opportunity for that nation to become acquainted with Portuguese African problems and West African reactions. Brazil may thereafter exert an important and beneficial influence on Portugal.

(4) We should consider using informal Vatican channels to assist in improving our relations with Portugal. These approaches could be justified on anti-Communist and non-racial lines.

(5) The U.S.

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(5) The U.S. should give quiet but definite encouragement to moderate elements in both Angola and Mozambique as they appear. Otherwise, these elements are bound to seek help elsewhere. If possible, liberal white groups in these areas should be encouraged to associate themselves with such Africans.

(6) The U.S. should make one final approach to Salazar offering a substantial AID program for Portugal, including the Portuguese African Territories. This program, centering its attention upon economic and educational development of both metropolitan and colonial peoples, would have the effect of placing Salazar on record against the U.S. and against progress for his peoples if he refused. In turn, if Salazar accepted that offer, it might help to create in Portugal, in Angola and in Mozambique the possibility of transition to more congenial regimes.

(7) The political pace of events is so swift that a merger of Angolan independence parties is likely. Such a merger would be favored by African nationalists of other Black African nations and it could hardly be opposed publicly by the U.S. The leverage for these moves is mainly in African hands. Our best recourse, therefore, is to hope that moderate leaders remain in strong positions in the movement, then to give tactful encouragement to them thereafter.

B. In the Central African Federation

The Problem. The imminent fragmentation of the Central African Federation and its likely reconstruction in another form, either

economic

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economic or political, is also of great consequence. The worst eventuality would be a union of sorts between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa including defense and economic arrangements, if not political ties. Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would thereafter be oriented toward the black nations to the north and east.

Given present trends, there is likely to be a strengthening of the Welensky-Verwoerd-Salazar axis at the southern tip of Africa. Further consolidation of the white redoubt is thus virtually assured. As in South Africa, the political and social status of the Black as contrasted with the White is the key issue in the Federation and nowhere is the cleavage between the two races more sharply drawn than in Southern Rhodesia. In the Federation, as in South Africa, the problem is complicated by U.S. investment (about \$200,000,000 in Northern Rhodesia alone) and the presence of U.S. nationals in considerable numbers.

It is not inconceivable that Sir Roy Welensky may use force to preserve "his Federation". This action would be gravely disturbing to the British and anathema to nearby independent African states. There is, however, a distinct possibility that in the wake of Mr. Butler's recent visit to Central Africa, the British will support full independence for Southern Rhodesia as well as each of the other territories.

The Objective

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The Objective. We should utilize all means at our disposal to prevent Southern Rhodesia from becoming more closely associated with the Republic of South Africa. Perhaps the simplest way to accomplish this would be to help --at least indirectly -- to recreate the Federation in a new form, possibly through a loose confederation. Maintenance of close ties between Southern and Northern Rhodesia would be highly beneficial in attainment of this objective. Thereby the relationships between the Blacks and the Whites of these areas might also be preserved.

Possible Courses of Action

(1) It is of utmost importance that we have a full and frank understanding with the British about the future of the Federation. Conversations with them could not only be developed around the "White Redoubt" concept but could be given added justification in view of current UN discussions on the Rhodesian problem as well as on grounds of heavy American investments in the area. It is essential that whenever possible we take action in concert, recognizing of course that at this stage it is the British and not we who must take the lead.

(2) The U.S. and the U.K. can perhaps best be of service if they can help develop goodwill among Federation leaders in the fields of politics, business and education. In this regard broadened AID programs for Northern and Southern Rhodesia might well be considered. It is recognized that this course may not now be acceptable to Sir Roy Welensky

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but it could strengthen the hands of his less reactionary lieutenants. Of specific use could be an expanded AID program for Southern Rhodesia as well as expanded overseas education programs for African leaders of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

(3) We should continue to encourage American investors already established in this area to pursue their enlightened labor and education policies. Wherever possible British capital should be encouraged to join in similar programs. Thus, as bellwethers they may be able to give support both to moderate African leaders in the Federation and to the cause of the white man in his relationship to the Black.

(4) Since the U.S. has good relationships with all top African Nationalist leaders in the Federation at present (to wit- Banda, Nkomo and Kaunda) we should consider the advisability of offering our services to them and to the UK as intermediaries looking (1) to a possible regrouping of the Federation on a new confederated basis primarily economic in nature; or (2) assuming Nyasaland's withdrawal, to a political reconstruction of Northern and Southern Rhodesia alone.

C. In South Africa

The Problem. The distinctions between the racial policies of South Africa and of the United States are clear. The U.S. provides Constitutional guarantees of equality under law for all races. This contrasts sharply with the situation in the Republic of South Africa

where

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where there is no political or legal equality among the races and the doctrine of apartheid or separateness of races is approved and promulgated by the Government in power.

Furthermore, the Government of South Africa has long voiced approval of "Bantustands" or separate nations of a sort for the various colored population. This is nothing more than an expansion of the "native reserve" idea and is economically and socially unfeasible in a country which depends on accessibility of low cost native labor for its largest industries.

Although many efforts have been made by liberal sectors of both colored and white populations, no softening of the South African Government's current "hard" racial attitude has yet been achieved. The white domestic opposition is extremely weak. The Black, Asian and Coloured populations are deeply pessimistic. Their leaders are flirting with violence and, in some cases, with Communism. They have tried pacifist methods, including passive resistance. These have failed thus far. They have sought to muster outside help with little significant success as yet. However, in recent months their efforts to obtain a political voice in the country, despite past failures, have gained renewed vigor and perhaps undercover support from the newly independent Black nations to the north.

Despite

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Despite their economic and educational advantages (or perhaps because of them) the Blacks of South Africa are in no mood to be left behind politically by the rest of Africa. The South African Government's political repression of non-whites in the face of critical world opinion, and that Government's potential alliance with the white settlers of Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories to maintain white dominion over Southern Africa, constitute the crux of the problem of the "White Redoubt". The U.S. has expressed its official concern to South Africa in sharp and repeated terms. Other nations have done likewise, and the matter is a major issue before the UN.

Another facet of the South African problem is American investment in the area, the total approximating \$500,000,000. There are also a large number of U.S. nationals residing and working in that country. A second facet is South Africa's questionable title to the old League of Nations "mandated territory" of South West Africa, now under review by the International Court of Justice and under scrutiny by the UN. A third facet is the existence of the three British High Commission Territories (Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland) within the geographic confines of South Africa. These serve as safe havens for political refugees and as such as irritants to officials of the Republic and are detrimental to United Kingdom-South Africa relationships. Basutoland is becoming a particularly difficult place of

refuge

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refuge since it houses many Africans of leftist leanings and now has an established Communist Party.

The Objective. The U.S. objective now as in the past must be to seek a decided modification of South Africa's current racial policies. In so doing we must help to preserve that nation's internal stability and reestablish her harmonious relationships abroad. This objective must be pursued by an imaginative combination of firmness and tact. Our main aim must be to press South Africa to liberalize its racial, social and political policies swiftly, in order to alleviate the explosive pressures now building up within the country. At the same time we must recognize that to isolate South Africa completely would probably be ruinous and would only more effectively solidify the reactionary forces in all the white strongholds remaining in that vicinity.

Possible Courses of Action

(1) We should continue to make demarches at the highest levels, expressing our deep conviction that it is in South Africa's best interest that her colored peoples be given adequate political representation as well as social and economic equality. These overtures should be friendly yet firm. Such representations might well include an exchange of letters between President Kennedy and President Verwoerd.

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Should the situation worsen, consideration might be given to the use of a personal emissary from the U.S. President in support of our ambassadorial demarches.

(2) In company with the U.K., the U.S. should give consideration to guaranteeing the sovereignty of the High Commission Territories (if and when they become independent) and be prepared to protect them against economic strangulation or political and military take-over. This proposal requires further study which is now underway. Alternatively, an interim UN trusteeship should be considered for these areas. At the same time, in order to avoid further Communist penetration of the High Commission Territories, the U.S. in company with the U.K. should discuss a joint approach to informational, educational, cultural and economic assistance programs.

(3) The United Nations may seek to invoke economic sanctions against South Africa during the forthcoming (17th) General Assembly over the question of South West Africa. (Here the U.S. may experience great difficulty in view of its recent stand for economic sanctions against Cuba.) It is recommended that several related courses of action be taken including:

(a) a firm stand on the thesis that no final determination of the South West Africa issue be made until the International Court of Justice has ruled on the ground that the case is sub-judice;

(b) insistence

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(b) insistence that even after a decision is handed down by the court, a plebiscite of the people of South West Africa be held to determine their wishes; and

(c) if economic sanctions are threatened against South Africa by the UN, the possible temporary recall of our ambassador as was done recently in the case of the Dominican Republic and Haiti. (This last course would be adopted only in the event of South Africa's firm refusal to cooperate with the UN and the Committee on South West Africa, an intransigent attitude which it does not yet appear to have adopted.)

(4) On the military side we should see to it that no further arms shipments go to South Africa since we know this material would be utilized against the African population in an event of uprising. It is recognized that cutting off arms shipments may pose difficulties in the face of our currently expanding space and missile program in South Africa. Insofar as possible we should attempt to coordinate this curtailment of military shipments with the British.

(5) U.S. investments in South Africa total more than \$500,000,000. American investors may find their holdings endangered in the event of conflict. They will undoubtedly attempt to have the U.S. Government soften its position toward South Africa and her racial policies. In so doing, however, it must be remembered that a new dilemma is at once created for significant U.S. investments in Black areas

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areas of Africa (e.g. Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria). Ordinary protection must be afforded these investments and the citizens who watch over them. However, it is recommended that no major modification of our efforts to achieve more liberal race policies in South Africa be sought merely on the grounds of protecting investments in that country alone. It may be possible to seek some liberalization of South African policies through combined action of U.S. and U.K. business firms. These possibilities should be explored by our diplomatic representatives in the Republic.

D. Relations with Other African States

The Problem. The development of power blocs in Africa has produced a situation which is quite likely to become a force in the cold war. The Casablanca group, including Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic and possibly Algeria, has formed a defense alliance as announced on April 8. This organization will undoubtedly take over extremist position regarding the white settler areas. It is likely that this bloc will give funds and assistance to any enemy of the white axis in Southern Africa. It is also likely that the Monrovia powers, a more moderate Black African group, including Liberia, Nigeria and the French community, would proceed more cautiously or be more restrained in any questions relating to South Africa and the "White Redoubt" even though they would ordinarily range themselves against operations of the Casablanca Conference.

The developing

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The developing group of independent and soon to be independent states in East Africa led by Tanganyika and Ethiopia are also strongly against the Republic of South Africa, the Portuguese domination of African territories, and Welensky. They can be certain to furnish their southern African brethren with funds and assistance in subversion. In the case of Ethiopia, they may even be able to furnish troops, should the worst come about. The U.S. has good friends in each of these power blocs. If a collision occurs we shall be forced to make difficult choices.

The Objective. Once again, strong efforts to mitigate the collision of Blacks and White settler groups would appear to be the best course in terms of U.S. policy objectives throughout Africa.

Possible Courses of Action.

(1) We should make a thorough "across-the-board" investigation of sales of arms and munitions to Black African states including previous recipients such as Ethiopia, Mali and Liberia. In this effort we should seek the fullest cooperation of the metropolises. However, we should leave ourselves sufficient leeway to meet unexpected bloc intrusions. Unless our actions are strict and straightforward these nations are in danger of entering into an arms race harmful to themselves and others.

(2) The U.S. should watch closely the growth and aims of the African High Command and whenever possible should channel the energies of such "alliances" into U.N.-controlled vehicles.

(3) The U.S.

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(3) The U.S. should utilize its diplomatic strength and good offices where possible to avoid the creation of competing military alliances and power blocs in Black Africa.

(4) The U.S. should likewise make every diplomatic effort to see that no Black African military power is thrust against the "White Redoubt".

E. Corollary Areas of Action

(1) Relations with Other Western Powers

In view of the difficulties which these situations may raise in future sessions of the U.N.--including problems of South West Africa, apartheid, the Rhodesias, and even the High Commission Territories -- some effort should be made to bring the more enlightened European nations abreast of our thinking on the danger of the "White Redoubt", particularly as it relates to the possibility of racial war.

We have already discussed possibilities of joint action with the U.K. in South Africa and the Rhodesias. In the near future it may be possible to make approaches to France for assistance in this area, especially when the Algerian question has been more fully resolved.

The Scandinavian countries have always favored liberal racial policies. Their recent tribute to Chief Luthuli, granting him the Nobel prize, is indicative of their current thinking on the problems of South Africa. The Germans too have a deep interest in Africa,

though

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though perhaps more commercial in tenor. These countries may be prevailed on to interest themselves in the problem and certainly the Scandinavian countries could give strong moral support to any efforts we might make within the U.N. to soften the danger of impending racial conflict. In turn, the Germans might also be utilized to put pressure on South Africa to modify its policies, as might the Dutch.

(2) Relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc

The Communist Bloc will continue to fish in troubled African waters. Should Black-White conflict materialize in Southern Africa the Sino-Soviet Bloc could be expected to make the most of the situation to the detriment of the U.S. The Chinese Communists may be in a particularly strong position on grounds of race. They are well established at various vantage points along the east and northeast African coasts, including Dar-es-Salaam, Mogadiscio, Khartoum and Cairo and from these embassies could now easily extend their influence southward. The Soviets with embassies in the same area can be depended upon to mount similar actions. Both countries are represented in West Africa as well. The Communist embassies at Conakry and Accra provide a springboard for "technical services" to "radical" African states wishing to move against the White Redoubt.

No specific course of action can be suggested here to counter these prospective activities. Insofar as possible they must be

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watched and exposed to the host governments with necessary counter-measures taken. Khrushchev's thesis of "liberation from imperialist rule" deserves particularly close scrutiny in the remaining colonial areas of Africa.

It is strongly recommended, however, that consideration be given to any early visit to Africa by President Kennedy -- this in the light of a possible Khrushchev tour of West Africa.

(3) Our Position in the United Nations

As has been emphasized constantly in the past two years, our voting strength in the General Assembly of the U.N. has been gradually diluted by admission of the many new Afro-Asian nations. Virtually all of these are nations of color. Almost half (51) of the total membership of 104 are members of the so-called Afro-Asian bloc. It is understandable therefore that any issue involving color and particularly those issues involving racial discrimination in such areas as Africa must almost automatically claim a majority vote against discriminatory practices. The U.S. cannot in justice or out of expediency, expect to stand against these forces. Abstention on most of these issues is more equivocation and indefensible at home and abroad. So long as the voting balance in the U.N. remains poised as it is there is little likelihood that the U.S. could exert its influence in a way which can be decisive unless it recognizes the facts of its own history. These

facts speak

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facts speak for themselves in terms of the Nation's Constitutional documents. These documents and our country's historic political principles have been re-stated by Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt and Kennedy, each of whom has stressed our belief in the right of self-determination for all.

IV. Conclusion

The "White Redoubt" concept, undergirded by the assumption that Blacks are not fully equal to Whites, is antithetical to American history and political theory. It is only in combatting these theories openly and frankly that we can win the respect of other nations and live in conformity with our own laws and historical principles.

We may be moving towards a situation in southern Africa in which the white-dominated governments will act in concert to frustrate black African nationalist efforts to unseat them. The policy suggestions contained in this paper are intended to inhibit these trends for a short time only. There is an urgent need for the formation of a long-term policy which could meet this particular problem and become a Grand Design for U.S. policy towards Africa as a whole.

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